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Public Utilities Under Home Rule
The power of the municipality in Ohio to construct, acquire or
contract with a public utility, was, prior to the adoption of the
Home Rule Amendment,1 limited to that expressly granted by the
General Assembly through various statutory provisions.2 Subse-
quent to the adoption of Article XVIII, however, that power no
longer derived from, nor was it subject to substantial limitation by
the legislature." The power granted to the municipality by Sec-
tions 4 through 12 of the amendment stems from the people of
Ohio, through the constitution.4 It is self-limiting,5 and, as such, is
not subject to implied limitations,6 nor those imposed by the legis-
lature.7 Further, the power is plenary and self-executing, 8 requir-
ing no implementation by the legislature,9 and it is not necessary
that the municipality in order to exercise the power shall have
adopted a charter under Section 7 'of the amendment. 0 This is
not to say that the legislature may not constitutionally limit the
disposition of surplus revenue, nor that the assembly may not in-
directly impose a limitation under section 13 of the amendment
by prescribing a debt limit.
A statute in derogation of the provisions of the sections re-
ferred to above is of no effect, even though enacted prior to the
adoption of the amendment.- Thus, the statutory power to con-
tract with a privately owned utility prior to November 15, 1912,12
was supplanted on that date by -the exclusive power- so to con-
tract provided by Section 4, Article XVIII, and, therefore, duties
required of municipalities in regard to the exercise of powers ac-
IO~ro CONST. Art. XVIII.
'OHIo CONST. Art. XIII, § 6. Omo GEN. CODE §§ 3955, 3990, 4000-1 et seq.
Village of Euclid v. Camp Wise Association, 102 Ohio St. 207, 131 N.E.
349 (1921).
'Link v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 102 Ohio St. 336, 131
N.E. 796 (1921); State ex tel. City of Toledo v. Weler, 101 Ohio St. 123,
128 N.E.788 (1920).
'Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
'Priest v. City of Wapakoneta, 8 Ohio Op. 439, 32 N.E. 2d 869 (1937).
'Ibid.
'Link v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 102 Ohio St. 336, 131 N.E.
796 (1921).
'Priest v. City of Wapakoneta, 8 Ohio Op. 439, 32 N.E. 2d 869 (1937);
State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Weiler, 101 Ohio St. 123, 128 N.E. 88 (1920).
'State ex rel. Doerfier v. Otis, 98 Ohio St. 83, 120 N.E. 313 (1918).
"'Village of Euclid v. Camp Wise Association, 102 Ohio St. 207, 131
N.E. 349 (1921); Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140
N.E. 595 (1923); State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Weler, 101 Ohio St. 123,
128 N.E. 88 (1920).
"Dravo-Doyle v. Village of OrrvilIe, 93 Ohio St. 236, 112 N.E. 508
(1915).
"Effective date of Home Rule Amendment.
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quired under pre-existent statutes were no longer enforceable,
since the power of the legislature to impose such duties no longer
existed.13
Traditionally, the term "public utility" has been used to de-
scribe a type of business enterprise which exists for the accommo-
dation of the public, the members of which as such are entitled as
of right to use its facilities.14 Usually such an enterprise is thought
of as monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic in form, and that fact
presumably accounts for the existence of regulatory controls over
utilities.
Every state allows municipal ownership and operation of public
utilities, 5 but the term "public utility" is variously defined among
the different states. Oklahoma courts have defined the term very
broadly to include such things as a cemetery,16 a convention hall,17
a cotton gin,18 sewers,'3 public fire stations,2 ° and public parks. 1
Iowa and Oregon courts include a golf course within the scope of
their definitions. 22 Texas courts include bathing pools.2" Texas mu-
nicipalities may manufacture "anything .-. . that may be needed by
the public. ' 24 A Michigan court used the public use test in at least
one decision, wherein the court said: "Utility means state or quality
of being useful. Was this plant one useful to the public? If so, it
was a public utility.' 25
Although the question has not been frequently litigated in
Ohio, her courts have generally attributed a narrower connotation
=OHIo GEEN. CODE § 3963, which prohibits a municipality from charging
schools, hospitals and charitable institutions for water, was held invalid,
as in contravention of Art. XVIII, § 4, in Board of Education v. Columbus,
118 Ohio St. 295, 160 N.E. 902 (1928). As to hospitals, see Kasch v. Peoples
Hosp. Co., 54 Ohio App. 80, 5 N.E. 2d 1020 (1936), (appeals dismissed 181
Ohio St. 286, 2 N.E. 2d 778 (1936)). As to charitable institutions, see Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Camp Wise Association, 102 Ohio St. 207, 131 N.E. 349
(1921).
14RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 191a; Junction Water Co. v. Riddle, 108 N.J.Eq.
523, 155 Atl. 887 (1931); Springfield Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Slringfield,
292 Ill. 236, 126 N.E. 739 (1920).
-Reese, State Regulation of Municipally Owned Electric Utilities, 7
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 (1939).
2Denton v. City of Sapulpa, 78 Okla. 178, 189 Pac. 532 (1920).
'Schmoldt v. Oklahoma City, 144 Okla. 208, 291 Pac. l19 (1930).
'Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Cotton County Gin Co., 40 F.2d 846
(C.C.A. 10th 1930).
"State ex rel. Edwards v. Millar, 21 Okla. 448, 96 Pac. 747 (1908).
"Oklahoma City v. State, 28 Okla. 780, 115 Pac. 1108 (1911).
'Barnes v. Hill, 23 Okla. 207, 99 Pac. 927 (1909).
'Golfview Realty Co. v. Sioux City, 222 Iowa 433, 269 N.W. 451 (1936);
Capen v. City of Portland, 112 Ore. 14, 228 Pac. 105 (1924).
'City of Belton v. Ellis, 254 S.W. 1023 (Ct. of Civil App., Texas, 1923).
211 Tsx. L. REv. 530, 533.
"Schurtz v. Grand Rapids, 208 Mich. 510, 175 N.W. 421 (1919).
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to the phrase, confining it to the more traditional meaning. This
would include water, gas and electric plants, street railway' and
bus facilities, sewage disposal units, and the like. A public audi-
torium is not a utility in Ohio,26 but its purchase by a municipality
was allowed. A stadium was held not to be a utility. 7 A theatre
was also held not to be a utility.28 However, an airport is a utility,
29
and a public garage is within the definition to the extent that it
is used for governmental purposes. 0
The problem of what constitutes a public utility in Ohio for
purposes of exercising the power granted under Article XVIII,
Section 4, arises infrequently. But for purposes of determining tax
exemption of municipally-owned utility property, recent decisions,
as will be more fully indicated later in ithis discussion, have denied
tax exemption where the utility was being operated in the munic-
ipality's proprietary capacity as distinguished from its govern-
mental capacity.' There would seem to be a danger that the tax
exemption cases might be used as authority for narrowing the defi-
nition of public utility and thereby limiting the power of munic-
ipalities to acquire or construct public utilities under the authority
of Article XVIII, Section 4.
Sections 4 and 5 of Article XVIII are exclusive in determining
the procedure to be followed to acquire or construct a public utility,
or to contract with a privately-owned utility for products or serv-
ices. 2 The power of a municipality to contract with a privately-
owned public utility for its products or services cannot be modified
by statute, 3 nor by a restriction in a home rule charter. 4
The procedure for acquisition or construction of a utility, as
well as for contracting with a privately-owned utility for services,
is initiated by ordinance.35 In the case of contracts with privately-
owned utilities for services, the written acceptance of the ordinance
by the utility consummates a binding contract.3 Whether the or-
'Heald v. City of Cleveland, 19 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 305, 27 Ohio Dec. 435
(1916).
'Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 35 Ohio App. 20, 171 N.E. 606 (1930).
'State ex Tel. Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St 71, 102 N.E. 670 (1913).
'Toledo v. Jenkins, 143 Ohio St. 141, 54 N.E.2d 656 (1944); State'ex rel.
Chandler v. Jackson, 121 Ohio St. 186, 167 N.E. 396 (1929).
"City of Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St. 465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
'Zangerle v. Cleveland, 145 Ohid St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720 (1945); City of
Shaker Heights v. Zangerle, 148 Ohio St. 361, 74 N.E.2d 318 (1947).
'Kuertz v. Gas & Elec. Co., 27 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 221 (1927).
'Lima v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 Ohio St. 416, 126 N.E. 318
(1919); Link v. Public Utilities Commission, 102 Ohio St. 336, 131 N.E. 796
(1921).
"Gas & Fuel Co. v. Columbus, 42 F.2d 379 (C.C.A. 6th 1930).
'
3OHIo CONST. Art. XVIII, § 4.
'State ex rel. Sweeney v. Michell, 46 Ohio App. 59, 187 N.E. 739 (1933);
Link v. Public Utilities Commission, 102 Ohio St. 336, 131 N.E. 796 (1921).
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dinance anticipates acquisition or construction of a utility, or merely
contracting with a utility for services, it shall not be effective for
30 days subsequent to its passage.3 7 If within that 30-day period
a petition signed by ten percent of the electors who cast votes
at the last preceding general election be submitted, a referendum
shall be had,38 in which event the ordinance shall not be effective
until approved by a majority of the persons voting on the issue.3 9
In the absence of a petition for referendum, the council is without
power to submit the issue to the electorate.4 0 The referendum pro-
vided for in Section 5 is permissive, and the state legislature may
compel a referendum without petition where the legislature has
relaxed limitations on the power of the municipality to increase
its indebtedness. 41 In such a case, the courts have imputed an un-
willingness to the legislature to subject the municipality to in-
creased indebtedness without approval of the electorate.
The right to referendum provided for in Section 5 is only ap-
plicable to the ordinance initiating the procedure for acquisition
or construction of a public utility or for a contract with a utility
for services, assuming that such ordinance provides for methods
of financing the project.42 Subsequent ordinances implementing the
execution of the initial ordinance are exempted from referendum
under Section 5.43 Thus, -a filtration plant added to a waterworks
was considered exempt from Section 5, but subject to the referen-
dum provisions of Ohio General Code Section 4227-1 et seq.4 4 Of
course, any attempt by a municipality to reconstruct an existing
utility under the guise of adding to it in order to evade the refer-
endum provision of Article XVIII, Section 5, would be considered
an abuse of power, and, therefore, subject to judicial intervention. 45
The 30-day period in Section 5 within which a petition may be
filed is jurisdictional.46 An attempt by a municipality to change the
30-day period by charter provision was held to be ineffective.4
37oiBo CONST. Art. XVIII, § 5.
'Ibid. For sufficiency of petition, see State ex rel. City of Middletown
v. City Commission of Middletown, 140 Ohio St. 368, 44 N.E.2d 459 (1942).
"Onmo CoNsT. Art. XVIII, § 5.
"State ex rel. Wehr v. Bellevue, 138 Ohio St. 93, 32 N.E.2d 839 (1941).
"State ex rel. Campbell v. Cincinnati Street Railway Co., 97 Ohio St.
283, 119 N.E. 735 (1918).
'State ex rel. Didelius v. Sandusky, 131 Ohio St. 356, 2 N.E.2d 862
(1936), overruling State ex rel. Diehl v. Abele, 119 Ohio St. 210, 162 N.E.
807 (1928).
" ibid.
"Shryock v. Zanesville, 92 Ohio St. 375, 110 N.E. 937 (1915). Accord:
State ex rel. Nicholl v. Miller, 127 Ohio St. 103, 187 N.E. 75 (1933). But cf:
Priest v. Wapakoneta, 8 Ohio Op. 439, 32 N.E.2d 869 (1937).
'Shryock v. Zanesville, supra, note 44.
"State ex tel. Sweeney v. Michell, 46 Ohio App. 59, 187 N.E. 739 (1933).
"Ibid.
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In some states, the acquisition of public utilities is not subject to
referendum.48
The proviso in Ohio General Code Section 3990, requiring a
village, which proposed to enter the electric or .gas utility busi-
ness, to purchase the facilities of a privately-owned gas or electric
utility conducting such a business therein, where such utility still
held an unexpired franchise, was held unconstitutional, in Dravo-
Doyle v. Village of Orrville49 as an unwari'anted limitation on the
power of municipalities to -acquire or construct utilities as granted
in Article XVITI, Section 4.
Municipally-owned or operated public utilities are not within
the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, and
are specifically excepted by Ohio General Code Section 614-2a from
regulation by the Commission except as to the requirement of sub-
mission of accounts and records and as to valuation of property
at the request of the municipal council.50
Under the grant of Article XVIII, Section 4, the power to con-
tract for services or products of a privately-owned public utility
would seem necessarily to include the power to contract as to
rates.51 Rate-fixing, however, is subject-to +he restrictions imuosed
by the legislature coincident to the legislative grants of power to
the municipaTIty to fix rates. Ohio General Code Section 3982 al-
lows arJMtnar-y-exercise of rate-fixing power by municipal ordinance.
Ohio General Code Section 3983 prescribes that where the company
concerned has filed an acceptance completing a contract for service,
for a period not exceeding ten years, such contract is binding on
both parties for that period.-2 Both-of -these sections antedate the
adoption of the amendment,.which contains no corresponding time-
limitation on the municipality's power to contract with a utility.
It would seem that the unlimited grant to the municipality would
dispose of this pre-existing statutory limitation,, but municipal at-
tempts to contract for longer than the statutory period are in-
valid. The Public Utilities Commission is, broadly, available to
the company concerned only where the municipality has failed to
act effectively,53 in which event the commission is empowered to
"Ore. Laws 1933, c. 354 § 1. See also: Fla. Laws, 1935, Sen. Bill No.
515, § I (g).
"93 Ohio St. 236, 112 N.E. 508 (1915).
5033 OHIO JuR., Title, Public Utilities, § 43.
"Ohio River Power Co, v. Steubenville, 99 Ohio St. 421, 124 N.E. 246
(1919).
"Link v. Public Utilities Commission, 102 Ohio St. 336, 131 N.E. 796
(1921).
O1mo GEN. CODE § 614-44. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio
St. 173, 140 N.E. 884 (1923); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 137 Ohio St. 225, 28 N.E.2d 599 (1940).
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fix rates,4 or where the municipal ordinance fixes unreasonable
rates which have not been accepted by the company.55 The power
of the commission to revise in certain circumstances the rates pre-
scribed by the municipality is an exercise of the police power of
the state,56 and is paramount to the self-governmental powers al-
lotted to the municipality in Article XVII 5 7 This provides in ef-
fect that an administrative agency of the state has the power to
revise legislation of the municipal governing body. Provision is
specifically made by Ohio General Code Section 614-44 for the util-
ity to appeal from the legislation of a municipality in regard to
rate-fixing where such is deemed unreasonable. This provision has
been held not to be in violation of Article XVIII.5 8 Appeal may be
made to the Public Utilities Commission which is authorized to
take jurisdiction and fix reasonable rates in revision of the munici-
pal ordinance.59 Or suit may be brought in a court of competent
jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the unreasonable rates. 0
Further, it is within the power of the Public Utilities Com-
mission to revise an ordinance which requires extension of the
distribution system,6' improvement of street railway rails or facil-
ities,62 improvement of waterworks, 63 or which grants an inde-
terminate permit,64 that is, a permit which allows operation for
an indeterminate period, until such time as the municipality shall
exercise its right to purchase the property of the utility, and in
such case, even where there is a stipulated price."
It is difficult to contend effectively that the power of the munic-
ipality to regulate public utilities has been much enlarged under
the provisions of Article XVIII. The pre-Home Rule limitations
10mo GEN. CODE § 614-44. See Local Telephone Co. v. Cranberry
Mutual Telephone Co., 102 Ohio St. 524, 133 N.E. 527 (1921):
'Onio GEN. CODE § 614-44.
"Cleveland Telephone Co. v. Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 121 N.E. 701
(1918).
5mIbid. OH3o CONST. Art. XVIII, § 3.
"Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 98 Ohio St. 320, 121 N.E.
688 (1918).
O 0o GEN. CODE § 614-44.
'United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio St. 173, 140 N.E. 884 (1923);
New Lexington v. Ohio Fuel Supply Co., 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 537, 27 Ohio
C.D. 678 (1913).
61OHio GEN. CODE § 614-51.
=OHIo GEN. CODE § 3812-2.
OHo GEN. CODE § 1255 et seq.
OHio GEN. CODE § 4000-1 through § 4000-15.
6Ibid.
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imposed by the legislature have been continued in effect.26 The
effect of the Home Rule Amendment in this field has been to se-
cure these powers to the municipalities free of the danger of com-
plete destruction by legislative enactment, but there' has been no
enlargement over powers as they existed prior to the adoption of
the amendment insofar as regulation is concerned, with the ex-
ception of such local police powers, granted under Article XVIII,
Section 3, as may be classified as regulatory powers.
The great majority of the cases involving appeal from munic-
ipal ordinances as being unreasonable have resulted in revision
and modification of the ordinances in question by the Public Util-
ities Commission.67 It has been argued that -this indicates a pro-
tection by the commission of the privately-owned public utilities
from local prejudices and antagonisms. This conclusion paints a
disturbing picture of the relationship between the municipalities
and the utilities, and raises doubt as to the wisdom of extended
municipal contracting and regulating authority. On the other hand,
the result quite conceivably may depend upon an honest trait of
utility-mindedness on the part of the commission. Certainly such
an explanation is not an impossibility under the circumstances.
It seems clear that municipallyowned property, although
classed as a public utility, is subject to real and personal property
1OHo GEN. CODE §§ 614-44 et seq, 3959, 3982, 3983, 4000-1 et seq.
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ironton, 107 Ohio St. 173, 140 N.E. 884 (1923);
Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Commission, 91 Ohio St. 331, 110 N.E. 461
(1915). Cincinnati v. Roettinger, 105 Ohio St. 145, 137 N.E. 6 (1922), held
that statutory limitation over the disposition of surplus revenue was not
such control on the conduct or operation of the municipal waterworks as
to 1e invalidated by Art. XVIII of the constitution. On the theory that
income from municipal utilities over and above the cost of supplying the
service or products is classifiable as tax revenue, the court further held
that in §§ 4, 5 and 6 of Art. XVIII there was no implication that munici-
palities have full authority over rates and charges as such implied authority
would render meaningless all limitations on taxation. It is argued that the
retention of legislative control over the disposition of surplus depends then
on § 13 of Art. XVIII. The retention of other regulatory powers is sought
to be justified as an exercise of the state police power, and included among
the "general powers" with which, by the provisions of § 3, Art. XVIII,
municipal ordinances are not to be in conflict. This retention acts as an,
indirect, but very real limitation upon the rate-fixing and regulatory
powers of the municipality. How broad, then, is the grant of §§ 4, 5 and 6
of Art. XVIII? It would seem that to follow the theory of the court to its
logical conclusion would lead inevitably to the result that the legislature
might thoroughly emasculate the power of the municipality to acquire and
construct utilities by forcing it to 'submit to confiscatory rates, and the
power to contract with a private utility, by hamstringing the municipality's
powers of regulation over the utility with which it contracts. For a dis-
cussion of the legislature's regulatory powers over the disposition of sur-
plus, see infra, page 149.
'33 OHio Juim., Title, Public Utilities, § 187.
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taxes in Ohio, unless specifically exempted, as are waterworks,68
or unless used exclusively for public purposes.69 Ohio General Code
Section 5351 states that "public property used for a public purpose"
shall be exempt, but includes no requirement 'as to the exclusive-
ness of the purpose. But the Supreme Court of Ohio has twice held
that the requirement of exclusiveness is implicit; 0 that in the op-
eration of a transportation system which has shown a clear profit,
the municipality is operating in a proprietary, as distinguished
from a governmental capacity, and that both real and personal
property incident to the operation are taxable. The court draws
heavily on the constitutional provision authorizing the legislature
to exempt real property that is used exclusively for public pur-
poses, 71 and carries that restriction over to apply to personalty by
a rather strict construction of Section 5351. Further, there is some
argument that the intent of the legislature is clarified by a consid-
eration of Section 5357, which exempts waterworks property from
taxation. Some criticism has been advanced that the distinction
between proprietary and governmental functions has been made de-
pendent upon the fact of profit-making. This, critics claim, puts
a premium on inefficiency, and renders the municipally-owned
utility which operates at a loss exempt from taxation. The court
has not been squarely faced with the question. The decided cases
have determined merely that Section 5351 must be interpreted
to read "public property used exclusively for a public purpose" is
exempt from taxation, and that the real and personal property of
municipally-owned, profit-making rapid transit lines do not fall
within such exemption. In the Cleveland Railway case, 2 it was
forcefully contended by the counsel for the utility that the primary
purpose of the railway was to furnish efficient transportation for
the inhabitants of Cleveland, that such purpose was controlling,
that the municipally-owned utility was entitled to incidental profit,
without such profit making the public property liable tb taxes.
The court denied the contention, and was apparently satisfied to
rest its decision on the proprietary capacity theory. It is interesting
to note that the Supreme Court of Arkansas, faced with an inter-
pretation of a constitutional provision which read in part "public
property used exclusively for public purposes" stated: "[the
phrase] must be given a practical construction and so used means
1OHIo GEN. CODE § 5357.
"Zangerle v. Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720 (1945).
"Ibid. City of Shaker Heights v. Zangerle, 148 Ohio St. 361, 74 N.E.2d
318 (1947).
"OHIo CONST. Art. XII, § 2.
"Zangerle v. Cleveland, 145 Ohio St. 347, 61 N.E.2d 720 (1945).
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'substantially all' or 'for the greater part.' "3 The cases may be
distinguished on the facts, since the Arkansas case was not con-
cerned primarily with a tax exemption problem, but rather with
a dispute concerning sale of surplus products by the utility. In any
event, the law in Ohio seems well settled as to tax exemption of
municipally-owned public utilities acquired by virtue of the pro-
visions of Article XVIII. Unless the real and personal property
can be shown to be used exclusively for a public purpose, or un-
less it be specifically exempted by the legislature, there is no
exemption from property taxes.
The municipally-owned public utility is ordinarily financed
by bond issue. Article XVIII, Section 12 provides that financing
bonds which exceed the municipal debt limit may be secured
by the revenue and property of the utility, but not by the general
credit of the municipality.7 4 Mortgage revenue bonds are the com-
mon media for financing municipal utilities.
The rates -and charges exacted by a municipal utility for its
service or product are not taxes They are the price exacted for
the product or service."' The normal necessary drains upon the
revenues derived from the rates and charges of the municipally-
owned utility include the current operating costs, payment of in-
terest on the mortgage revenue bonds, and reduction of the bonded
indebtedness. If, after -the normal charges against the revenue
have been made, there remains a surplus, certain provisions of the
Ohio General Code have prescribed a disposition of such surplus. 7"
Prior to the adoption of the amendment, the pertinent statutes
limited the disposition to improvement of and addition to the utility
Sin question. Subsequent to the adoption of the amendment, and in
the absence of express statutory limitation, it was initially held
that such surplus, derived from revenue as distinguished from
taxes, was not within the purview of Ohip General Code Section
5625-13a, which permitted transfer by the municipality of funds
under its control to other funds, on the theory that such statute,
being within the tax sections, pertained only to tax revenue.78
That decision soon was modified insofar as the court had dis-
tinguished between tax revenues and those derived from other
sources, and the court upheld the transfer of 'the surplus from an
electric plant to a general' fund under the authority contained in
"Yoes v. City of Fort'Smith, 207 Ark. 694, 182 S.W.2d 683 (1944), inter-
preting ARK. CONST., Art. XVI, § 5. Accord, County of Anoka v. City of
St. Paul, 194 Minn. 554, 261 N.W. 588 (1935).
7 Ono CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 12.
"Lakewood v. Rees, 132 Ohio St. 399, 8 N.E.2d 250 (1937).
"Ibid. City of Shaker 'Heights v. Zangerle, 148 Ohio St. 361, 74 N.E.2d
318 (1947).
7OHio GEN. CODE §§ 400-26, 3959.
"Lakewood v. Rees, 132 Ohio St. 399, 8 N.E.2d 1250 (1937).
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Section 5625-13a.78 The cases may be distinguished on the facts,
since the previous decision concerned surplus from a waterworks,
the surplus of which is controlled by the provisions of Ohio Gen-
eral Code Sections 3959 and 3960. The later decision seems to be
authority for the proposition that a municipality may support its
less profitable activities with the surplus revenues of other more
profitable utilities, except waterworksY'
When a municipally-owned utility produces an amount of
product greater than that needed within the municipality, the
question of disposition of surplus arises. Sale of surplus products
of such utilities is allowed in all states except MissourL81 There,
the constitutional and legislative provisions concerning utilities
fail to provide for extra-territorial sales, and the courts have re-
fused to find an implied power in the municipalities to sell to out-
lying areas.82
The majority rule seems to be in accord with the Missouri
holding, but later cases indicate that the minority rule is gaining
'City of Niles v. Union Ice Corp., 133 Ohio St. 169, 12 N.E.2d 483
(1938).
"The courts' recognition of the retention by the legislature of certain
regulatory powers has already been discussed at length hereinbefore (see
note 66 supra). In Ellis v. Urner, 29 Ohio Op. 553, 15, Ohio Supp. 72 (1944),
the court specifically stated that § 3959, Ohio General Code, was an excep-
tion to the general fund transfer statutes. The court has been zealous in
preserving this exception, even when the waterworks surplus was sought
to be applied to related and dependent expenditures such as sewage dis-
posal facilities, as in Hartwig Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 128 Ohio St. 583,
192 N.E. 880 (1934), and fire hydrants, as in Alcorn v. Deckebach, 31 Ohio
App. 142, 166 N.E. 597 (1928). Contra, Johnson v. Dermott, 189 Ark. 830,
75 S.W.2d 243 (1934); City of Harrison v. Braswell, 209 Ark. 1094,
194 S.W.2d 12 (1946); Guthrie v. City of Mesa, 47 Ariz. 336, 56 P. 2d
655 (1936). Other than surplus waterworks revenue, there would seem
to be no difficulty in Ohio barring the free transfer of any municipal
utility surplus to any municipal fund. Oo GEN. CODE § 5625-13a.
The source of the legislature's power to prescribe the disposition of
surplus revenues is difficult to define. In Cincinnati v. Roettinger, 105
Ohio St. 145, 137 N.E. 6 (1922), the court adopts a theory that revolves
around the possibility that, by charging excess rates, and transferring an
abormal surplus to the general municipal funds, such surplus becomes, in
effect, a left-handed tax, whereby the normally tax-borne governmental
expenses are a burden instead on the utility-buyers. It is conceded that
such an evasion of the legislature's admitted control of municipal taxing
power should be subject to limitation in some form, but the view presently
expounded by the Ohio courts denies, in effect, the right of the municipality
to a fair return, if it should be the desire of the legislature thus to limit
the rates and charges.
Taylor v. Dimmitt, 336 Mo. 330, 78 S.W.2d 841 (1935).
Reese, State Regulation of Municipality Owned Electric Utilities, 7
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 557 (1939).
"Taylor v. Dimmitt, supra, note 81.
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strength. That is to say,- there is a tendency to imply a power in
the municipality to sell the surplus products of its utilities to out-
lying territories. 3 But there is still a reluctance to allow the munic-
ipalities, in the absence of express statutory authority, to extend
the facilities of its utilities beyond its corporate limits.
By constitutional provision in Ohio, municipalities may sell
the surplus products of their utilities, including transportation
service, to outsiders. However, such sale may not exceed 50% of
the "total service or product supplied by such utility within the
municipality. '8
4
Determination of the amount saleable as surplus has been liti-
gated in Ohio in a transportation case."5 Where a village which had
5 buses, making 25 daily round trips for its inhabitants, added 2
buses and 10 round trips, it was held not to have violated the 50
percent rule. The court discarded the mileage test and the number
of passengers test in determining the amount of service used by
the inhabitants of the village, and said that the amount of equip-
ment and facilities plus the human agencies reasonably required
to operate them, constitute public utility service.
It is sbmitted that the test is too broad in cases involving,
transportation, and that its use in a case involving electricity, gas,
or water, might serve only to cloud the issue. Under the literal
interpretation of -the syllabus of the case, a municipality could en-
large its transportation facilities to include an area of very great
size. It is conceded that in cases concerned with sale of surplus
electricity, water or gas, the product is more easily measured, and
that, therefore, the problem is less likely to arise.
In any event, the law is clearly settled in Ohio that the munic-
ipal utility may not only sell its product beyond the corporate
limits of the municipality, but that it also *may extend its facilities
beyond the corporate limits, subject only to the limitation of Ar-
ticle XVIH, Section 6 of the Constitution of Ohio.8
Burton Stevenson
Robert W. Minor
"98 A-L.R. 1001.
'Oro CONST. Art. XVIII, § 6.
'Southwestern Bus Co. v. Village of North Olmstead, 41 Ohio App.
525, 181 N.E. 491 (1932).
'Miller v. Orrville, 48 Ohio App. 87, 192 N.E. 474 (1934).
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